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STOP AND FRISK: AN HISTORICAL ANSWER TO A MODERN PROBLEM
LOREN G. STERN
Although stop and frisk legislation has only re-
cently become a subject of national concern and
debate, the police power to detain and question is
as old as the common law of England. Detention
and questioning were well known to, and strongly
enforced under, the English common law. Early
case holdings and statutes empowered the night-
watch of each town to detain "suspicious night-
walkers" until the morning at which time the
watchman would either release the suspect or
arrest him if grounds for arrest were discovered.
1
Even private individuals were authorized to detain
suspicious night-walkers until they gave a proper
account of themselves.2 In 1839 the English Parlia-
ment extended the common law power to detain by
authorizing police to search any vessel, carriage,
and persons who could be reasonably suspected of
possessing stolen goods.1
A number of state courts of the United States
have followed the English common law and, in the
absence of statutory provisions, have upheld the
power of police officers to stop, question, and frisk
suspects under reasonable circumstances. These
courts have found that the police have a duty to
stop and to question under circumstances "which
I HALE, PLEAS OF TEE CRowN 88,97 (Wilson ed. 1800);
2 HAWKINS, PLEAS or =an CROWN 164, 173 (7th ed.
1795).
2 2 HAwKmNs, PLEAs OF T~m CROWN 129 (8th ed. 1824).
3 W Iams, Police Detention and Arrest Privileges-
England. 51 L CRrm. L.. C. & P.S. 413, 418 (1960).
reasonably require investigation and to frisk as
incident to inquiry." 4 This power to detain is
based upon a standard which is less than probable
cause-a standard of reasonable suspicion, much
like the one prescribed by the English Parliament.
The reasonableness of any detention and investi-
gation is determined as a question of constitutional
fact under the circumstances of each individual
case.
5
4 See People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P. 2d 52
(1956); People v. Ambrose, 155 Cal. App. 2d 513, 318 P.
2d 181 (1957); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y. 2d 441, 201 N.
E. 2d 32 (1964); People v. Salerno, 38 Misc. 2d 467, 235
N.Y.S. 2d 879 (Sup. Ct. 1962); State v. Chronister, 353 P.
2d 493 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960); Hargus v. State, 58 Okla.
Crim. 301, 54 P. 2d 211 (1935); United States v. Bonanno.
180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); State v. Hatfield, 112
W. Va. 424, 164 S.E. 518 (1932); State v. Zupan, 155
Wash. 80, 283 Pac. 671 (1929); State v. Cantrell, 310
S.W. 2d 866, (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1958); People v. Henneman,
367 Ill. 151, 10 N.E. 2d 649 (1937); People v. Exum,
382 Ill. 204, 47 N.E. 2d 56 (1943); State v. Kilday,
155 A.2d 336 (R.I. 1959); State v. Gluczynski, 32 Del.
120, 120 At. 88 (1922); City of Portland v. Goodwin,
187 Ore. 409, 427, 210 P. 2d 577, 585 (1949); Gisske v.
Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 Pac. 43 (1908).
SSee, e.g., United States v. Vita, 294 F. 2d 524
(2nd Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962). Fif-
teen months after a bank robbery which Vita com-
mitted F.B.I. agents asked him to come to F.B.I.
headquarters. Vita agreed and was not taken to head-
quarters against his will. He was told that he was
not under arrest, was free to go at anytime, and that
anything he said could be used against him. Vita con-
sented to fingerprinting, a lie detector test, and to par-
ticipating in two line-ups. After six hours he confessed
to the robbery. Vita claimed that his confession was
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Although only five state legislatures have felt
the necessity to pass stop and frisk legislation,
many state legislatures have otherwise given the
police authority to detain suspicious persons by
enacting vagrancy statutes authorizing the arrest
of any person suspiciously loitering. These
vagrancy statutes are not as broad as stop and
frisk statutes, yet these statutes can often en-
compass the situation where a detention would be
called for.
In the last few years, law enforcement agencies
have consistently sought the enactment of stop
and frisk legislation, partially, at least, in response
to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Mapp v. Ohio.7 Before the Mapp de-
cision, one-half of the state courts, including
New York, allowed incriminating evidence to be
admitted at trial even though it was seized in-
cident to an unlawful arrest. But the New York
decisions left some doubt whether an officer could
detain a suspect for questioning if he did not
made during an unnecessary delay before being brought
in front of a commissioner.
The court held that a reasonable detention is not
necessarily a short one.
It is at such a time [during questioning when the
suspect responds with explanations or denials]
that law enforcement agents must work with
all possible speed to verify that [the suspect]
says and run down leads which develop in the
process. This takes time. The question of when 5A
is violated is decided on the facts of each case. The
policy of reasonableness indicates that arrest should
not include all detention. If there is justification for
delay then the delay is not unnecessary. The de-
tention is not an arrest nor unnecessary if the con-
tinuing process of essential investigation is being
carried out expeditiously, the suspect has been ad-
vised of his constitutional rights, and there is no rea-
son to believe that the procedures being followed
are used merely as an excuse for delay during which
a confession can be extracted.
6 CAL. Px.N. CODE § 647. Every person who roams
about from place to place without any lawful business;
or Every person who wanders about the streets at late
or unusual hours of the night without any visible or
lawful business; or Every person who loiters, prowls or
wanders upon the private property of another, in the
nighttime, without any visible or lawful business with
the owner or occupant thereof; or who while loitering.
prowling or wandering upon the private property of
another, in the nighttime, peeks in the door or window
of any building or structure located thereon and which
is inhabited by human beings, without visible or lawful
business with the owner or occupant thereof: is a
vagrant and is punishable by fine of not exceeding S500
or by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or by both
such fine and imprisonment.
See Foote, Vagramy-Type Law and Its Administration,
104 U. PA. L. REv. 603 (1956); Note, Use of Vagramy-
Type Laws for the Arrest and Detention of Suspiciouts
Persons, 59 YA.E L.J. 1351 (1950).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
have an arrest warrant and there were no grounds
for arrest 3 Thus a police officer was never quite
sure whether a detention was constitutionally
valid. Police officials felt that the mandatory
exclusionary rule of Mapp, when congidered with
antiquated arrest statutes and the diverse state
court holdings on the power to detain, improperly
restricted effective police action. The police de-
manded that the legislature pass a stop and frisk
statute which would permit a policeman to detain
and frisk a suspect on the grounds of reasonable
suspicion, thereby eliminating the necessity of
grounds for arrest.9 These officials believed that
the New York legislature had precedent for en-
acting a stop and frisk statute. Other states on
the Eastern Seaboard had enacted stop and frisk
statutes even before the Mapp decision. The
legislatures of these states, knowing that police
may often wish to investigate without having to
bring the suspect to the station house for booking
and arraignment, passed legislation providing a
category of permissible restraint other than arrest
and thus allowed police a greater flexibility in
their investigations and in the performance of
their duties.10
s Cases holding that police cannot detain suspects
where grounds for arrest do not exist; People v. Tinston,
6 Misc. 2d 485, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 554 (Magis. Ct. 1957);
Arnold v. State, 255 App. Div. 422, 425, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 28.
30 (3d Dept. 1938), rev'd on other gronds, 280 N.Y. 326,
20 N.E. 2d 774 (1939). Contra; People v. Entrialgo, 19
App. Div. 2d 509, 245 N.Y.S. 2d 850 (2d Dept. 1963),
aff'd mem., 14 N.Y. 2d 733, 199 N.E. 2d 384, 250 N.Y.S.
2d 293 (1964).9Memorandum of the New York State Combined
Council of Law Enforcement Officials to the New York
State Legislature In Relation to Temporary Questioning
and Search for Weapons, 38 ST. Jons L. REv. 392,
400 (1964).
10 Text, Interstate Commission on Crime, Interstate
Crime Control 86-89 (1942).
Section 2: Questioning and Detaining Suspects.
(1) A peace officer may stop any person who he has
reasonable grounds to suspect is committing,
has committed or is about to commit a crime,
and may demand of him his name, address, bus-
iness abroad and whither he is going.
(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify
himself or explain his actions to the satisfaction
of the officer may be detained and further ques-
tioned and investigated.
(3) The total period of detention provided for by
this section shall not exceed two hours. The de-
tention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded
as an arrest in any official record. At the end of
the detention the person so detained shall be
released or be arrested and charged with a crime.
Section 3: Searching for Weapons. Persons Who
Have Not Been Arrested.
A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon
any person whom he has stopped or detained to
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Thus in 1964, urged by the police officials and
encouraged by its neighbors' legislative actions,
New York enacted a stop and frisk statute de-
rived from, similar to, but more limited than the
Uniform Arrest Act." In the state of New York an
officer may stop and question any person "abroad
in a public place" whom the officer "reasonably
suspects has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit a felony or serious misdemeanor."
If the officer "reasonably suspects" that he is in
danger, he may search for dangerous weapons
on the suspect's person. If he finds a weapon or
"any other thing, the possession of which may
constitute a crime," the officer can keep it until
the end of the questioning "at which time he
shall return it if lawfully possessed or arrest such
person." 12
Stop and frisk statutes present the judiciary
with a problem which has confronted them before
-the problem of balancing. In determining the
constitutionality of the stop and frisk statutes,
the courts must balance the right of a citizen
to move freely about without any undue restraint
or interference by law enforcement agencies, and
his right to liberty and privacy, against society's
need to maintain order by the prevention of
crime and the ability to bring criminals to justice
quickly and efficiently.13 There are no Supreme
Court decisions dealing with the constitutionality
of stop and frisk statutes, 4 but the holdings of
federal courts on other constitutional issues
closely related to those presented by the stop
question as provided in Section 2, whenever he has
reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger if
the person possesses a dangerous weapon. If the of-
ficer finds a weapon, he may take and keep it until
the completion of the questioning, when he shall
either return it or arrest the person. The arrest may
be for the illegal possession of the weapon.
"The New York statute is more limited than the
Uniform Arrest Act since the New York statute is
limited only to felonies and serious misdemeanors while
the Uniform Arrest Act encompasses any crime.
12 N.Y. CODE C1IM. PRO. § 180-a(2).
's Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924). The
right of liberty, privacy and the right to move freely
about without undue interference is a natural right of
all United States citizens. These rights are guaranteed
to all citizens under Amendment IX of the Constitution
and under the "due process" clause of the XIV Amend-
ment. CoRwIN, UNDERSTAN' ING THE CONSTITUTION,
104, 117, 118 (1949).
'4 "he issue will be decided in the 1967-68 Term. See
Peters v. New York, 18 N.Y. 2d 238, 219 N.E. 2d 595,
prob. juris. noted, 386 U.S. 980 (1967); Sibron v. New
York, 18 N.Y. 2d 603, 219 N.E. 2d 196 (1966), prob.
juris. noted, 386 U.S. 954 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 5 Ohio
App. 2d 122, 214 N.E. 2d 114 (1966), cert. granted, 387
U.S. 929 (1967).
and frisk statutes may be good indicators of
whether the Supreme Court will hold these statutes
constitutional.
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
all searches and seizures; it prohibits only those
which are unreasonable. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that in order for an arrest to
be reasonable, it must be based upon probable
cause. 5 The Court has defined probable cause
as existing when "the facts and circumstances
within [the arresting officer's] knowledge and of
which [he] has reasonably trustworthy informa-
tion [are] sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that [an offense has been or is
being committed]." The Court must "deal with
probabilities ... they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which prudent
men ... act. 7
It is true that both an arrest and a stop are
"seizures" within the meaning of the constitution,
but that is where the similarity ends and the
differences begin. Not every restriction of absolute
freedom of movement is an illegal police action
demanding suppression of evidence.'
8 Also, not
every detention is an arrest.9 An arrest-a formal
apprehension-which leads to arraignment, book-
ing, and public trial is usually, though not neces-
sarily, the gravest form of seizure." The stop
authorized by stop and frisk statutes, contrasted
with an arrest, "is relatively short, less conspicu-
ous and less humiliating to the person stopped,
and offers much less chance of police coercion." 21
There are no charges made against the suspect
and, usually, no record made of the stop.
The distinction between an arrest and a deten-
tion has been recognized by English jurists and
legislatures for hundreds of years. The English
common law made a clear distinction between
an arrest and a detention. By statute and case
holdings, the night-watch could detain a suspicious
night-walker "and if no suspicion be found, he
11 Carroll v. United States, supra n. 13; Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23 (1963).
1" Carroll v. United States, supra n. 13.
17 Brinegar v. United States, supra n. 15.
18 United States v. Bonanno, supra n. 4.
19 United States v. Vita, supra n. 5.
0 Although all arrests are not absolutely graver than
a detention, those arrests which go to the station house
or to court are graver than any detention.
2"LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police:
An Analysis of Current Practices, 1962 WAsH. U. L.Q.
331, 356-60.
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shall go quit." ' The basis for detention was not
a "mere causeless suspicion" or hunch; the basis
was a "'just ground for suspicion." 2 This just
ground for suspicion was not the equivalent of
probable cause. If, during the detention, grounds
for arrest (probable cause) were found, the night-
watch was to arrest the suspect21 Thus, it is
apparent that the English common law permitted
detention without an arraignment on grounds
less than probable cause while requiring probable
cause for an arrest.
Even where stop and frisk legislation has not
been enacted, one-fifth of the state courts have
consistently distinguished between detention and
an arrest. These state courts have held that police
officers have a right to stop and question suspects-
to take investigatory action-without this action
constituting an arrest.2 These courts hold that
a detention is not an arrest if the detention is for
a reasonable length of time. In determining what
is a reasonable length of time, the courts look
to the circumstances of each case.
The most recent example of this rationale is
State v. Dill,, 2 6 decided by the Supreme Court
v 2 HAwxKus, PLEAS OF THE CROwN, supra n. 2.
23 Lawrence v. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6
(1810). In this case the suspect was passing through the
streets at 11:00 at night with a bundle in his possession.
He was stopped by the night-watchman and taken to
the watch-house where he was questioned as to what was
in the bundle and who had given it to him. His reply
was that he did not know what was in the bundle, but
that he was carrying it to his sister's house. The sus-
pect referred the watchman to an address where the
watchman could inquire for proof of his veracity. No
inquiry was made and the suspect was held in jail until
morning when he was released. This detention was valid,
the court holding that "watchmen ... have authority at
common law to arrest and detain in prison for examina-
tion, persons walking in the streets at night, whom there
is reasonable ground to suspect of felony, although there
is no proof of a felony having been committed." Queen
v. Tooley, 2 LD Raym 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (KB
1709). Here a statute was passed authorizing constables
to arrest all disorderly persons (street-walkers). A con-
stable arrested a woman whom he suspected of being a
street-walker. His suspicion was due to the fact that
once before he had arrested her for being a street walker.
The court held that constables may seize suspicious per-
sons, but it must be a "just ground of suspicion." It
is not a constable's suspecting that will justify his taking
up of a person, but it must be just grounds of suspicion
... the will of the constable cannot rule-the liberty of
the suspect cannot depend upon the will of the constable."
Here the constable did not have a reasonable ground for
suspicion. The woman had done nothing to arouse any
suspicion. The constable's only basis for suspecting the
woman of being a street-walker was his past experience
with her and this was not a sufficient basis for suspicion.
24 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CRowx, supra n. 1.
25 See cases cited in n. 4, supra.
26 -J.-(1967).
of New Jersey in July, 1967. A veteran member
of the New Brunswick Police Department was
patrolling a low income, high crime rate section
of the city at 3 a.m. The officer had worked in
this area for over fifteen years and was familiar
with the people there. He noticed the defendant
and another man, both strangers to him, walking
and constantly turning their heads to look behind
them. These men went to a municipal parking
lot and were standing between two autos when
they noticed the officer observing them. The two
men turned and left the parking lot. The officer
stopped them, got out of the patrol car and asked
them what they were doing in the lot. The reply
was "Nothing". The officer told the two men
that they were under arrest and gave defendant
Dilley a "quick frisk" by patting him on the out-
side of his jacket. He felt a pistol which he im-
mediately removed and discovered it to be a
loaded .38 caliber revolver. The other man was
also found to be armed.
Both men were convicted of carrying a con-
cealed weapon, but only Dilley appealed his
conviction. The trial court had denied Dilley's
motion to suppress the revolver as illegally seized
because (1) there was a valid arrest and an in-
cidental taking of the gun and, in the alternative,
(2) there was a lawful right to question Dilley
and incidentally frisk him for the officer's protec-
tion.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed
Diley's conviction holding that the arrest and
incidental taking of the weapon were lawful.
"However, we need not pursue this issue for we
are satisfied that the trial court's alternative
ground for denial of the motion represented a
sound approach to the important constitutional
and enforcement problems presented and should
be reaffirmed here." The court then declared
that police officers' duties include "vital preventive
roles;" that they must have the right to stop
persons on the street for summary inquiry where
the circumstances are so suspicious as to call for
inquiry. The court declared that the temporary
detention which is incidental to summary inquiry
is not a formal arrest requiring probable cause
and that the legality of the inquiry cannot de-
pend on what label the street detention is given,
"but rather on whether it was reasonable in the
light of the circumstances .... In determining
reasonableness, weight must of course be given
to all of the pertinent factors including the basis
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of the suspicion on the part of the police and the
nature and extent of the restraint on the individual.
Where, as here, the circumstances disclosed highly
suspicious activities at three in the morning on
the city streets and in the city parking lot, the
inquiry was not only reasonably called for, but
was actually dictated by elemental police re-
sponsiblities."
The court went on to hold that the frisk was
obviously a greater intrusion on privacy than the
detention. "But here again the formal labeling
of the action should not be controlling and the
test should be its reasonableness in the totality
of the circumstances." Therefore, the right to
frisk necessarily exists when the circumstances
point to the need of such action for the officer's
protection. In this case the officer was alone,
confronted by two men in the early morning
hours, didn't know what these men were carrying,
and felt that there was a good possibility that he
could have been killed by one of them. Thus,
his frisk was for self-protection.
The distinctions between an arrest and a de-
tention are clearly pointed out and emphasized
by the stop and frisk statutes. The Uniform Arrest
Act provides for a new category of detention
in the course of an investigation which is not an
arrest. The detention is just a "street stop"
which may occur at any place and at any time
in order for a short, superficial investigation of the
suspect. The New York statute authorizes a
"stopping for temporary questioning" only and
not an arrest. The courts of those states having
stop and frisk statutes have consistently upheld
the validity of the legislatures' distinction between
an arrest and a detention.
2 9
In defining probable cause the Supreme Court
has balanced the individual's interests against
27 Uniform Arrest Act § 2(3).
2 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 180-a(1): A police officer
may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he
reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is
about to commit a felony or any of the crimes specified
in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter (serious
misdemeanors), and may demand his name, address and
explanation of his actions.
29 Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 174 A. 2d 560 (R.I. 1960);
DeSalvatore v. State, 52 Del. 550, 163 A. 2d 244 (1960);
Cannon v. State, 53 Del. 284, 168 A. 2d 108 (1961);
Commonwealth v. Lehan, 196 N.E. 2d 840 (1964)
(dictum). People v. Mercado, 262 S. 2d 641 (1965);
People v. Koposesky, 269 S. 2d 486 (1966); People v.
Rodriguz 262 S. 2d 863 (1965). Other states have passed
statutes which are similar to the Uniform Arrest Act and
which distinguish between an arrest and a detention-
CAL. PEx. CODE 833 (1957); Wis. STAT. 954.03 (1961);
Mo. REv. STAT. 84.090, 84.440 (1959).
those of society. The Court has held that an ar-
rest, the highest degree of seizure, requires proba-
ble cause in order to be reasonable under the
mandate of the Fourth Amendment. 0 A court
determines if there was probable cause for the
arrest by looking at the circumstances of each
case and deciding whether the officer's belief
was reasonable under the particular circumstances.
Probable cause is the officer's reasonable belief-
the probability under the circumstances. The
basis for detention under the stop and frisk stat-
utes is reasonable suspiciozn-the possibility under
the circumstances. By definition suspicion is just
one step removed from belief.
3'
At this point we must note that the Court has
never held that an arrest or seizure occurs at the
first instant of restraint upon the suspect. - Other
federal courts have recognized a distinction be-
tween arrest and detention.n Since a detention is
a much lesser degree of seizure than an arrest,
a detention should require a lesser degree of
justification than does an arrest.34 Suspicion is
this lesser degree. If the courts find that an officer's
suspicion was reasonable under the circumstances,
then this standard for detention certainly seems
to meet the Fourth Amendment requirement of
reasonableness. The Supreme Court has declared
that it is "not unmindful" of the needs of society
for efficient law enforcement.3 If so, it must per-
mit the Fourth Amendment standard of reasona-
bleness to reflect the difference between a detention
for a brief investigation and a formal arrest.
11 Carroll v. United States, supra n. 13; United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Brinegar v. United
States, supra n. 15; Ker v. California, supra n. 15.
31Leagre, 54 J. CiRu. L., C. A.D P.S. 393, 412 (1963);
Kuh, 56 J. Can. L., C. A.uLD P.S. 32 (1965); Kavanagh v.
Stenhouse, supra n. 29.
1 Schoenfeld, 17 SYR. L. REv. 627, 639 (1966).
1 United States v. Vita, supra n. 5; United States v.
Bonanno, supra n. 4.
-" Support for this author's opinion that a variable
probable cause is the test which must be used in deter-
mining the reasonableness of any restraint on a suspect
can be found in SCHAEFER, THE SusPEcT Ain SocrETY
25 (1967). "It seems to me more relevant to ask whether
there is probable cause for restraining the suspect than
to ask whether there is probable cause for believing in
the suspect's guilt. The Fourth Amendment does not, I
submit, preclude us from weighing the extent of the de-
tention against the strength of the evidence that justi-
fies it." Justice Schaefer goes on to say, "[t]he argument
based on reasonableness is a strong one." Justice Schaefer
would like the test of reasonableness of a police officer's
conduct to be stated in terms of "what the reaction
would be if he had not done what he is charged with
having done wrongfully. If you would fire the officer
for not doing what he did, then what he did was rea-
sonable." Id. p. 41.
15 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
[Vol. 58
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Although the Supreme Court has not yet had
the opportunity to use the balancing of interests
approach in the area of temporary detention,
it has been employed in other cases dealing with
the Fourth Amendment.
The case of Frank v. Maryland,16 and the cases
of Camara v. Municipal Cour 37 and See v. Cily of
Seatlc,8 which overruled Frank, (to the extent
that although a warrant is required for adminis-
trative searches of homes and businesses not
open to the public, the degree of probable cause
necessary for such a search warrant to issue is
less than ordinarily required in warrant cases),
are important precedents in the area of temporary
detention for two reasons.
[These cases] illustrate the willingness of the
Court to recognize that the traditional pro-
tection of the Fourth Amendment may be
flexibly interpreted when faced with a high
degree of public interest, and [they] show that
the Court considers itself capable of weighing
various factors and balancing interests in
order to conclude whether a governmental
invasion of privacy was or was not reasonable.
The only distinction between this and the right
of temporary detention is the element of crimi-
nal procedure; a greater risk is involved
when the restraint is a preliminary step in
the process which may ultimately lead to
trial and conviction. Admittedly the danger
to the security of the individual is greater
under such circumstances. Yet it is not con-
tended that this increased risk is to be treated
as irrelevant; its consideration is necessarily
inherent in the nature of the balancing test
involved. Experience in other areas of the law
shows that the element of risk can be weighed
along with the value of the interests protected
and the social need for the conduct pursued.
33
36 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
37 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967).
87 S. Ct. 1737 (1967).
2 Leagre, supra n. 31 at 414. Frank v. 'Maryland, 359
U.S. 360 (1959). A Baltimore City health inspector was
investigating the exterior and surrounding area of
Frank's home for the source of a rat infestation. The
inspector discovered evidence of such an infestation in
the rear of Frank's home. The inspector did not have a
warrant to search, but he requested Frank to allow him
to inspect Frank's home. Frank refused this request and
was arrested the next day for violating § 120 Art. 12 of
the Baltimore City Code. Frank was convicted and ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court alleging that his arrest and
conviction for resisting inspection without a warrant
violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court affirmed the
conviction holding that "[iln light of the long history of
this kind of inspection and of modem needs, we cannot
When the Court has the opportunity to apply
the balancing of interests approach to the stop
and frisk statutes, it appears that it has ample
precedent for deciding that a detention under
the stop and frisk statutes does not violate the
prohibition of unreasonableness of the Fourth
Amendment and it should not interpret the
statutes as so doing.
Deciding that detention on less than probable
cause for arrest may be reasonable, however,
answers only half the problem. There remains
the question of the validity of the incidental
search or "frisk". The courts which have upheld
the validity of the search of a suspect incident
to a stop have done so on the basis that a search
for dangerous weapons is really only a "frisk."
The argument for upholding the frisk as con-
stitutional usually is stated as follows. just as a
detention is different than an arrest, so, too, is
the frisk which is incidental to a detention differ-
ent than a search. The frisk is of a limited scope;
"just a mere patting of the outer clothing" while a
search is a thorough investigation of the suspect's
person. 0 The right to frisk does not automatically
follow after every lawful detention. The officer
is only authorized to frisk a suspect when the
officer reasonably suspects that the suspect pos-
sesses a weapon which may be used to harm him.
The frisk is a precaution which contributes con-
siderably to the basic safety of the officer. The
state courts which have decided cases dealing
with the stop and frisk statutes have held that a
frisk, as a safety precaution, is constitutional.a
Even in the absence of stop and frisk statutes,
state courts have upheld the right of an officer
to frisk a detained suspect as a safety precaution.
42
say that the carefully circumscribed demand which
Maryland here makes on appellant's freedom has de-
prived him of due process of law."
40 People v. Rivera, supra n. 4.
41Under the circumstances presented in each case the
courts held that a frisk was not so unreasonable as to
be constitutionally forbidden. People v. Rodriguz, supra
n. 4; People v. Cassese, 263, S. 2d 737 (1965); Common-
wealth v. Lehan, supra n. 29; People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.
2d 65 (1965). In these cases it appears that the courts
realize the necessity for the detaining officer to protect
himself by a frisk of the suspect. If the circumstances
reflect that the officer may have reasonably suspected
the suspect of carrying a dangerous weapon, then the
officer's act of frisking was reasonable and did not fall
under the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreason-
able searches and seizures.
42 See note 4; Ellis v. United States, 264 F. 2d 372
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 998 (1959); Common-
wealth v. Reynolds, 4 Pa. D. & C. 262 (Quarter Session
1923); People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal 2d 448, 380 P. 2d
658 (1963) (diclum); People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645,
LOREN G. STERA'
And even some opponents of the stop and frisk
statutes admit that a frisk is necessary and con-
stitutionally permissible when used as a safety
measure.
43
The right to frisk, when used as a safety meas-
ure, after a lawful detention therefore parallels
the right to search after a lawful arrest. Just as a
detention requires a lesser degree of justification
than an arrest, so, too, does a frisk require a
lesser degree of justification than a full blown
search. Because a frisk does not interfere with,
restrict, or inconvenience a person to nearly as
great a degree as does a search, a lesser grounds
for justifying a frisk may still meet the Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness.
The argument that only a lesser form of search,
i.e., a "frisk", may reasonably accompany a lesser
290 P. 2d 531 (1955) (dictum). But see, White v. United
States, 271 F. 2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
In Ellis v. United States, the arresting officers were
specially assigned to look for the perpetrator of a num-
ber of day-time housebreakings in a certain area of
Northeast Washington D.C. They had the house-
breakers description. The officers saw a man that fit the
description roaming about the area checking homes to
see if anyone was home. The officers stopped the sus-
pect and asked him twice to take his hand out of his
pocket which he refused to do. The pocket had a bulge
in it which could have been caused by a gun. The officers
frisked him and found items (not a gun) which were used
as evidence against the suspect.
In People v. Rivera, three New York detectives in
plain clothes and an unmarked car were patrolling an
area with a high incidence of crime at 1:30 in the morn-
ing. The detectives observed two men walk up to the
front of a bar and grill, stop, and look inside for about
five minutes. The two men then' began to walk away,
stopped, came back and looked in the window again.
Upon noticing the detectives car, the men began to walk
away quickly. They were stopped and frisked. The
frisk uncovered a loaded .22 caliber revolver. The New
York Court of Appeals held that despite the absence
of probable cause for believing a crime is being com-
mitted or has been committed, neither state nor federal
law prohibits police from stopping and frisking a sus-
picious person. The court spoke of a bullet being the
answer to the officer's questions. "The frisk is a reason-
able and constitutionally permissible precaution to
minimize that danger." Supra p. 446, 201 N.E. 2d at 35.
In People v. Salerno, the arresting officers noticed the
suspect walking down the street at 3:15 in the morning
carrying a gun case. When asked what he was doing,
the suspect answered that he was going duck hunting.
The officers replied that there was no duck season in
July. The suspect then said that he was going to hunt
chipmunks. The officers asked to see the gun. It was a
fully loaded shot gun. The officers told the suspect that
he would have to come down to the station and gave the
suspect a quick frisk before he entered the car. The
frisk uncovered a hard object the size of a pistol. A more
formal search revealed a pistol and two hunting knives.
The Supreme Court of New York upheld the frisk as
reasonable under the circumstnaces.
43 Schoenfeld, supra n, 32; 78 HARv. L. REv. 473 (1964).
form of arrest, i.e., a detention, concedes too much,
however, and unnecessarily so. For the danger
that a suspect may be carrying a weapon and
may use it to escape from the police officer is
exactly the same whether an officer arrests a
suspect or merely stops him. Since the danger is
equally as great in either situation, and since a
search is reasonable if it is incident to an arrest,
a search for dangerous weapons should be reasona-
ble as an incident to the detention.
Although the statutes are labeled stop and
frisk, they authorize a search for dangerous
weapons. The majority of courts which have
dealt with these statutes have interpreted this
search to mean a frisk."4 There seems to be no
basis for this interpretation and no need to label
a search a frisk. The detaining officer has a right
to protect himself from injury by the suspect.
If the officer reasonably suspects that the suspect
has a dangerous weapon and may possibly use it
on the officer, the officer's only protection is a
search to uncover this weapon before it is used.
This search must be as extensive as necessary
in order to find the weapon and to assure the officer
that he is in no danger. Therefore, a search which
is incident to a valid stop and which is made as a
safety precaution is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances and does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment -prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Since the courts have consistently labeled the
search conducted by officers before the stop and
frisk statutes were enacted, and the search au-
thorized by these statutes, as a frisk, it seems
likely that both state and federal courts will be
exceedingly hesitant to free themselves of the
shackles of this precedent.45 The courts seem to
be looking for some method to allow a search
based on something less than probable cause.
The courts do this by labeling the search a frisk
instead of breaking away from the precedents
which make all reasonable searches those which
are based on probable cause. The Fourth Amend-
ment speaks only of unreasonable searches and
seizures. There is no reason why a search cannot
be based on something less than probable cause
and still be a reasonable one.46 The courts have
4"See note 41.4
1 See notes 41 and 42.4 6 SCHAEFE, supra n. 34, at p. 42. Justice Schaefer is
of the opinion that a search for dangerous weapons
which may be used against the detaining officer is a
reasonable search and meets the requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. See n. 34.
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not as yet adopted this viewpoint, and hold that
a search must be based on probable cause in order
to be constitutionally valid.
There is no reason, however, why an officer's
suspicion cannot be elevated to belief when the
suspect offers unsatisfactory explanations to the
officer's questions.a Nor is there any reason why
a frisk based upon a reasonable suspicion-and
engaged in by the officer as a safety precaution-
cannot, under some circumstances, become a
constitutionally valid search for evidence when
the officer's reasonable suspicion is raised to
probable cause on the discovery of a weapon. The
weapon discovered during the frisk can be ad-
mitted as evidence against the suspect since the
frisk, as a safety measure, was certainly not un-
reasonable under the circumstances. And after
discovery of a weapon a further, more thorough
search for evidence may be permissible because
the officer's suspicion that the suspect was carry-
ing a dangerous weapon has been elevated to
belief by his discovery. Therefore, the later fruits
of the search are also admissible as evidence
against the suspect because these fruits were
discovered by a search based upon probable cause.
To illustrate, suppose an upper middle class
neighborhood whose residents are all white which
has been the scene of many late night robberies
in the last few weeks. The victims of the robberies
have described the robber as either a Mexican
or Puerto Rican male, whose height is -about five
feet seven inches and whose weight is about one
hundred and thirty-five pounds. All the robberies
have been committed with the use of a pistol.
An officer notices a Puerto Rican male who fits
the robber's description and who seems to be
just roaming around the area at one o'clock in
the morning. The officer stops him and asks him
what he is doing in this neighborhood at this late
hour. The suspect's explanations are clearly un-
satisfactory and the officer, suspecting that this
person may be responsible for the many robberies
in this area, and suspecting that this person may
be carrying a gun with which to commit a rob-
bery, and fearing that he might use this gun. in
order to escape arrest, proceeds to frisk the sus-
a If the suspect refuses to answer, his refusal will not
contribute to any notion of probable cause. California
Police Training Bulletin #3 states that a suspect's re-
fusal to answer shall not contribute to probable cause.
Neither detention statutes nor states without detention
statutes which allow temporary stopping and frisking
provide any penalties for a suspect's refusal to answer
questions.
pect. Upon frisking the suspect, the officer feels
a hard object about the size of a pistol in the
suspect's coat pocket. The officer looks into the
pocket and discovers a pistol.
At this moment the officer's suspicion may be
confirmed; he may now reasonably believe that
this man is the cause of the many robberies in
the neighborhood. Based on this belief, the officer
conducts a thorough search and discovers a few
watches and billfolds. The officer then arrests
the suspect for robbery. If the true owners of the
watches and billfolds are found and, in fact, the
suspect is identified as the robber, the suspect
will be tried. The billfolds and watches which
the officer discovered on the suspect can be ad-
mitted as evidence at the trial court. The original
detention gave adequate grounds for a frisk for
safety purposes which, in turn, confirmed the
officer's suspicion and elevated it to a belief which
meets the probable cause standard of reasonable-
ness.
The Fifth Amendment provides that "no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law." Due process means that
there must be an ascertainable standard by which
the law is made clear to any reasonable man,
relieving him of the burden of guessing what the
law is.4 It has been argued that the stop and
frisk statutes violate the Fifth Amendment be-
cause of the vagueness of the term "temporary
questioning", the indefiniteness of the length of
time this "temporary questioning" can last, the
indefiniteness of the amount of force that an officer
can use to stop and question a suspect, and the
vagueness of the standard "reasonable suspicion". 9
"Temporary questioning" is just that; a brief
stop which will last no longer than it takes, for
example, for the suspect to give his name, his
address, and an explanation of his actions under
the N-ew York statute. Under the Uniform Arrest
Act the stop is also a brief one, taking no longer
than it takes the suspect to explain his actions
and the Act goes on to state that if the cursory
investigation does not dismiss the officer's sus-
picion, then a more thorough investigation is
authorized which may under no circumstances
last for more than two hours. Thus it appears
48 CORWAM, UNDERSTA.NDDG THE CONSTuTTox
(1949).
4 The terms 'temporary questioning' and 'reasonable
suspicion' are used in the New York stop and frisk statute




that the term "temporary questioning" is not
vague and that the length of time it can last is
clearly established by the statutes.
The stop and frisk statutes do not give an
officer the right to use force in order to stop and
question a suspect. The statutes say absolutely
nothing about the amount of force permissible,
but this fact does not violate the Fifth Amendmtnt.
When an officer asks a person to stop, most, if not
all, law-abiding citizens will do so out of respect
for the authority of the officer, if not the law.
When an officer asks a criminal to stop, most
criminals will stop. A criminal will stop even
though he has committed a crime, or is about to
commit a crime, because he feels that he can answer
questions adequately enough to dispel the offi-
cer's suspicion. A criminal may often stop when
asked to do so because of the fear that his flight
may lend credence to the suspicion that he was
about to or has committed a crime. The criminal
will often stop because of fear for his life; fear
that if he doesn't stop and begins to run, a bullet
may be used to stop him. Thus it seems that most
good citizens and many criminals will stop when
an officer asks them to stop. If upon the order
to stop a suspect begins to run away, the officer
may have reasonable grounds to suspect that the
suspect has committed some crime.50 At this
point the officer, as a law enforcer, has a duty to
apprehend the suspect for questioning using what-
ever force is necessary to accomplish this appre-
hension. It is probable that an officer will not
have to use any force in stopping most people
because they will stop when asked to stop while
in the few cases where force is necessary it will
be warranted.
Just as the framers of our Constitution failed
to define probable cause, so, too, have the framers
of the stop and frisk statutes failed to define
reasonable suspicion. The framers of the Con-
stitution left it to the courts to interpret the
meaning of probable cause. The framers of the
stop and frisk statutes have also left it to the
courts to define reasonable suspicion. Just as
.probable cause is defined on the basis of all the
facts of each case, so must the courts define reason-
able suspicion on the basis of all the facts and
circumstances of each case. In each case the reason-
0 Richardson v. State, 113 Ga. App. 163, 147 S.E.
2d 653 (1966); Robinson v. State, 93 Ga 77, 18 S.E.
1018 (1893): suspect's flight gives probable cause for
arrest. But cf. Wong Sun et at. v. United States 371 U.S.
471 (1963); under certain circumstances a suspect's
flight is equivocable.
ableness of the suspicion will depend upon the
special situation in which the suspect and the
officer find themselves. This is a workable stand-
ard. It is used by the courts in determining proba-
ble cause and must be used in determining reason-
able suspicion. As Professor Leagre so aptly states,
"the Court is capable of eliciting fundamental
standards through a process of judicial inclusion
and exclusion.., a certain amount of vagueness
is rather of the essence of a Constitutional prin-
ciple." 51
Nor do the stop and frisk statutes violate the
prohibition against self-incrimination embodied
in the Fifth Amendment. These statutes do not
compel a suspect to answer. A suspect cannot
be detained until he answers, the longest per-
missible detention under any statute being two
hours.52 And no statute provides any penalty
for a suspect's refusal to answer the officer's
question. In Miranda v. State of Arizona, the Court
held that "[g]eneral on the scene questioning as
to facts surrounding a crime or other general
questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process
is not affected by our holding. It is an act of re-
sponsible citizenship for individuals to give what-
ever information they may have to aid in law
enforcement. In such situations the compelling
atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody
interrogation is not necessarily present." The
stop and frisk which takes place at the point of
the stop and restricts the suspect's freedom only to
the amount of time it takes the suspect to give
his name, his address, and an explanation of his
actions falls under the category of general ques-
tioning in the fact-finding process.
Closely related to the prohibition against self-
incrimination is the Sixth Amendment mandate
that "the accused shall have a right to counsel
in all criminal prosecutions." The right to counsel
has been extended through the years to the point
where a person's constitutional right to counsel
is mandatory when a custodial interrogation is
conducted.M "By custodial we mean questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a per-
son has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any signifi-
cant way." 15 In Miranda, the Court distinguished
51 Leagre, supra n. 31, at 420.
-1 Uniform Arrest Act 2(3); see n. 10.
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1629 (1966).
54 Miranda v. Arizona, supra n. 52.
"5Miranda v. Arizona, supra n. 52, at 1612. The
Court also held that "[tihe principles announced today
deal with the protection which must be given to the
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between a custodial and a non-custodial interro-
gation, the latter being permissible without any
warning to the suspect of his right to counsel
and without any constitutional right to counsel
attaching at the time of the interrogation. When
the interrogation authorized by the stop and
frisk statutes is conducted at the point of the
stop, the suspect has neither been taken into cus-
tody nor deprived of his freedom in any significant
way. When questioning at the point of the stop,
the officer is usually not attempting to elicit a
confession from the suspect. The officer's purpose
is to investigate a suspicious situation and is
therefore a general inquiry only. Thus the stop
and the questioning which takes place at the
point of the stop clearly falls outside the category
which the Court would consider "custodial."
Once again quoting the Court regarding general
questioning, "[in such situations the compelling
atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody
interrogation is not necessarily present." -6
The stop and interrogation authorized by the
New York stop and frisk law does not fall into
the category of custodial interrogations and there-
fore is constitutional.
The Uniform Arrest Act should also meet the
test of the Miranda decision if subsection (3)
of Section 2 authorizing a detention of up to two
hours is removed.57 A two hour detention will
most assuredly be considered a significant depriva-
tion of the suspect's freedom. Also a two hour
detention will usually take place at the station
house and would therefore come within the specific
holding of the Court.Y
CONCLUSION
The stop and frisk statutes are a necessary
element of crime prevention. The ability to stop
and frisk a person on grounds of reasonable sus-
picion will aid the police in apprehending those
committing crimes and will aid in preventing
many crimes from being committed. The officer
no longer has to wait until a crime has been com-
mitted in order to stop and question a suspect.
Under the statutes, if it appears that a crime
may he attempted, the officer has the authority
to stop and question the suspect. If the officer
privilege against self-incrimination when the individual
is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody
at the station..." p. 1629.
56 Miranda v. Arizona, supra n. 52, at 1629.
57See n. 10.
5s See n. 53.
finds a weapon or if the suspect's answers are
inadequate, further police action is justified and a
crime may be prevented; while under the same
circumstances, but without a stop and frisk statute,
a crime might have been committed because of
the officer's inability to stop and question the
suspect
Even if the suspect is, in reality, a criminal
intent upon committing a crime, but his explana-
tions dismiss the officer's suspicion, it is highly
doubtful that even the coolest of criminals would
attempt a crime soon after the stop. During the
stop the officer obtains the name and address of
the suspect. If a crime is committed subsequent
to this stop and the perpetrator of the crime fits
the description of the person stopped, the officer
knows just where he can find a suspect who may
have committed the crime. Therefore, many crimes
may be prevented from ever occurring and many
crimes which do occur can be solved quickly and
efficiently because of the stop and frisk statutes.59
Even if the Supreme Court ultimately strikes
down the frisk incident to the stop as unconsti-
tutional because it is not based on probable cause,
"[t]he realities of life will demand that an officer
will in fact always frisk a suspect if he fears for
his life, regardless of the Constitution." 60 This
is not a malicious defiance of the Constitution
or the Court. The officer will frisk only because
he has no other alternative. The officer is given
the power to stop all suspicious persons, many of
whom are dangerous and carry dangerous weapons.
The officer will necessarily frisk in order to pro-
tect himself during the period of the stop. With-
out this power the officer subjects himself to a
high degree of risk of injury by a suspect who is
carrying a weapon and who is not afraid to use
it against a police officer. In order to encourage
our police officers to do their job properly, the
power to frisk has to follow the power to stop."
Even if evidence obtained from the frisk is
59Based on an interview with Detective Thomas
%1cCann of the Chicago Police Dept. Detective 'McCann
is presently in the license division of the force, but was
formerly in the sex offenses division of the force.
61 Schoenfeld, supra n. 32, at 633.
61Justice Schaefer suggests that a search should be
allowed incidental to a stop when the officer believes he
is in danger, but anything found during the search be
excluded from evidence. This solution allows "[tihe
search... to perform its authorized function of pro-
tecting the officer, but it could not serve the more ques-
tionable function of securing evidence against the
suspect."
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